CV

Ph.D. in Economics

Pennsylvania State University, United States

• Committee
  • Mark Roberts (Chair), David Argente, Karl Schurter

M.A. in Economics

Hanqing Institute, Renmin University, China

B.A. in Financial Engineering

Nanjing University, China

Assistant Professor of Economics

Research Institute for Global Value Chains (RIGVC), UIBE, China

Young Firms’ Financing Choices, Investment, and Growth (JMP)

• {"Abstract"=>"This paper investigates the impact of access to different financing choices on young firms’ future growth paths. According to the Kauffman Firm Survey data, over 2/3 of debt firms rely on credit card borrowing in the first five years of development. I construct a firm life-cycle model with financing constraints to address selection issues involved in the endogenous financing decisions. In this model, firms can simultaneously choose up to three debt financing sources--business bank loans, personal bank loans, and credit card borrowing. I find many firms increase their debt leverage, particularly through credit card borrowing, to avoid shrinking their businesses in bad times. Also, without credit card borrowing, debt firms quickly clear their debt within 4 years of development and assets accumulation level can drop by 11%. In the counterfactual analysis, I estimate how young firms react to the increasing financing cost caused by the local bank industry concentration. The increasing financing cost can lead to a rise in the ratio of debt firms with business bank loans by forcing firms that rely on credit card borrowing to clear their outstanding debt. When the financing cost is not too high for business loan borrowers, this selection mechanism can shift the firm size distribution to the right."}

Information Asymmetry and Bidders’ Behavior in Common Value English Auctions

• {"Abstract"=>"In common value English auction, bidders may have different levels of private information about the selling item. Due to the learning effect of the common value part, bidders with more precise information may be able to manipulate the auction outcome through strategic bidding behavior. However, English auctions are usually challenged by model incompleteness problem (Bikhchandani et al., 2002). To overcomes the identification challenge, I utilize moment inequalities implied by the bidder’s bidding history to estimate the value distribution and develop a structural econometric model to study the effect of information asymmetry on bidding behavior. The paper finds that the information premium mainly comes from the informed bidder’s screening effect and is independent of the number of participants. Applying the data from Chinese Justice Auction, the estimation result shows that the noisy part in signal is very large."}

‘Conventional’ Monetary Policy in OLG Models Revisiting the Asset-substitution Channel

• {"Appendix"=>"Online Appendix "}
• {"Abstract"=>"Conventional monetary policy involves actions by the monetary and fiscal authorities : the former sets a nominal interest rate and the latter sets lump-sum taxes to finance the implied flow of interest payments on government debt. We model such policy within an overlapping generations framework and show that absent any other frictions the magnitude of the nominal interest rate gives rise to asset substitution between government debt and either private debt or capital–substitution which has both real and nominal effects. Such substitution is not in standard New Keynesian models because those models use a dynastic specification in which government debt is not net wealth."}

• Bates White Award, Dept. of Economics, Penn State